I. Introduction
Threats to the availability of a system or service can take many forms. One such threat is a denial of service (DoS) attack. Disruption of a system or service may result. The attack may be part of a larger attack involving extortion, hijacking or fi scal damage. The means to achieve a DoS attack can take many forms.
For example, a vulnerability in software may enable a single malformed message to crash a system. In another example, an onslaught of unexpected traffi c may inhibit other legitimate communications. When these packet fl ooding attacks are sent from multiple diverse sources it becomes a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The frequent and sustained packet fl ooding DDoS attacks targeted at a system or service is what we have focused on in this paper.
Our expertise and operational experience draws heavily from our organization's domain name system (DNS) service offerings. [1] [2] We have experienced fi rst hand how frequently DNS systems and service providers are targeted by DoS and DDoS attacks. The reason why attacks target the DNS is relatively straightforward. The means by which most users locate services on the Internet is through the use of the DNS. For example, to access a web page at http://www. example.com, the browser's system performs a name lookup on www.example.com which results in the resolution of the domain name in the URL to an IP address. It is this resolution that is crucial to the availability of most services on the Internet. If the DNS resolution fails a user or application will often be unable to proceed because further communications to the desired service cannot be made. Attackers know this and often target the DNS as an alternative to directly attacking a specific system. Attacking the DNS may virtually incapacitate the victim's response, since they may not be able to change their DNS service as quickly or as easily as they might change their services and protocols on the affected server. In fact, due to caching, even if they change their DNS configuration, changes may not be widely disseminated for some time.
DNS service providers often provide resolution service for millions of domain names for individuals and organizations all over the world. As a result they have been required to build their infrastructure to withstand such attacks. As we show in this paper there are a number of mitgiation strategies. However, simply adding link capacity is not enough. In fact, a well-designed attack against a DNS service may be nearly impossible to defend against using traditional approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we survey previous work. In Section 3 we describe the typical packet flooding DDoS attacks seen by DNS service providers. In Section 4 we annotate a sample of some real-world wellknown and lesser-known packet flooding DDoS attacks seen by DNS service providers. In Section 5 we characterize the nature and motive behind many of the attacks. In Section 6 we discuss the mitigation strategies available and commonly used. Finally in Section 7 we summarize the problem, solutions and offer some suggestions on ways forward.
II. Related Work
It is often difficult to find authoritative and accurate information about real-world packet flooding DDoS attacks. It may be that some organizations would prefer to minimize or avoid any potentially negative publicity. An organization may also wish to downplay the threat and effectiveness of attacks to discourage copycat attackers. They may also be attempting to provide a kind of feedback spin to an attacker or the public. Attacks against the top levels of the Internet DNS infrastructure tend to be suficiently visible that details about the attacks and effects become public. In some cases the DNS service operators have provided analysis and disclosure as a public service. For example, operators of three root DNS servers jointly published a brief memo detailing the "nature and impact" of a packet flooding denial of service attack that struck in 2002. [3] The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), often a participant in the analysis of wide-reaching Internet events, has monitored the performance of the DNS root and gTLD nameservers since January 2002. Using NetTraMet passive monitors CAIDA was able to provide additional insight into the effects of the 2002 attack from several vantage points. [4] Attacks against the top-level domain (TLD) DNS infrastructure were relatively rare occurrences until early 2006. At that time a new and devastatingly crippling wave of attacks took advantage of open resolvers and the ability to source address spoof small queries to them producing an answer that was many times larger. These attacks came to be known as the open recursive amplification and reflection attacks. Verisign gave a detailed inside look at these attacks a few months after they occurred. [5] More recently, in early February 2007 a packet flooding DDoS attack hit a subset of the root and TLD servers. Some operators involved in the attack were attending a network operators meeting. As it turned out they were able to give a timely, but very preliminary analysis of that attack to the operator community as it happened. [6] Almost exactly one month later, ICANN released it's preliminary report on the February 2007 DNS attacks, which included some discussion on the overall effect of the root server system. [7] Security threats specific to the DNS have been reseached and analyzed for some time. One of the earliest examinations was done by Steve Bellovin in his seminal Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite paper. [8] However, packet flooding DDoS attacks specific to the DNS weren't widely discussed until later. One of the first public disclosures was in a message posted to the BUGTRAQ mailing list on July 30, 1999. [9] That class of attack is as much a threat today as it was in 1999 as we will show in the Section 3.
III. DDoS Packet Floods
There are millions of hosts connected to the Internet. [10] [11] [12] In aggregate these hosts have an enormous packet sending potential. Thanks to generous over-subscription and the benefits of statistical multiplexing, this aggregated potential is rarely realized. However, even a small number of distributed Internet hosts colluding to send network traffic at modest rates can overwhelm even the most well connected systems. Two thousand end systems sending at 256 Kb/s is slightly more capacity than half a 1 Gb/s Ethernet link. If estimates of global host infections are accurate, it isn't difficult to imagine how serious many attacks of this size would be.
[13] [14] [15] Today DDoS attacks are undertaken using a collection of robots, simply called bots, that form an aggregate network or botnet. A botnet can serve many functions, but generally is under the command and control of some coordination system employed by an attacker. Often this command and control function is through the use of internet relay chat (IRC), a web page or a peerto-peer protocol such as Overnet. A bot installed maliciously on a host may perform a number of functions such as capturing login credentials to a banking site or to send spam. Many bots also include the capabilities to perform a series of different kinds of packet flooding DoS attacks. Bots working together that are instructed to launch a packet flooding DoS attack make up a packet flooding DDoS attack.
A. Source Address Spoofing
A bot may employ several packet flooding evasion and exploitation techniques including forging the source address of the flood packets. While there are arguably some useful applications that would want to originate IP datagrams with a non-local address, the Internet community has deemed source address spoofing as a nuisance at best. [16] [17] Unfortunately, source address verification is not fully deployed on the Internet and it remains to be seen if it ever will be. [19] Packet flooding DDoS attacks employing spoofed addresses can hamper a victim's response. If source addresses are randomly spoofed or forged to impersonate otherwise legitimate sources, the victim cannot easily filter packets based on the source address. Source address spoofing may also hamper efforts to locate the true origin of an attack which is often useful in order to eradicate malicious hosts and perform forensics.
B. Reflection and Amplification
A malicious bot does not have to send attack traffic directly to a victim. A bot may attempt to use a third party to relay traffic to a victim. For example, a bot can send a packet to a third party host and trick it into sending packets to a victim by forging the source address in packets sent to the third party. If the third party responds, it will reply to the victim whose source address was spoofed. This action hides the true identity of the attacker from the victim. Attacks that employ unwitting third parties in this manner are referred to as a reflection attacks.
Data communications are often asymmetric in nature. That is to say packet sizes and packet rates flowing in one direction may be greater than in the other direction. This is often true of client/server applications including DNS. An inbound DNS query tends to be bounded by the name being resolved with a 255 byte limit. However, answer data may be much larger as well as contain auxillary information such as authoritative server details and hints. We can measure the amplification factor of a name by comparing its size in bytes to the size of it's answer. In practice the amplification factor is relatively modest, but it is entirely feasible for a small name to map to a very large answer. In fact, using the extension mechanisms for DNS, an answer may be as large as 4 kilobytes. [18] If the name is example.org and the answer to a question about that name is 4 kilobytes, the IP datagram amplification factor is approximately seventy to one! Source address spoofing can be combined with an amplification vector to unleash devastingly harmful packet flooding DDoS attacks which can be very difficult to mitigate. We will examine one such real world attack in the Section 4.
C. Well-formed Message Attacks
Source address spoofing can be defeated with anti-spoofing measures. Reflection and amplification attacks can also be mitigated by ensuring anti-spoofing mechanisms are widely deployed. If spoofing and reflection were unavailable to an attacker they could simply unleash a packet flood using parameters assigned to each bot. This could allow each sending bot to be quickly identified and presumably filtered or commandeered. However, the attacker can prevent this if the packet flooding trafic from each bot were indistinguishable in format, content and rate from other legitimate sources. If the victim is primarily a client system, then the destination could be moved or filtered to mitigate the attack. In the case of server-oriented systems, such as those providing DNS services, mitigating the attack by moving or removing the victim's connectivity may not be feasible. In this unique class of attacks which we term a "well-formed message attack", mitigation may not be possible with traditional packet flooding DDoS attack responses. We will discuss a range of responses in Section 6, including some that can prove effective for these particularly troublesome attacks.
IV. Case Studies
In recent years the domain name system has come under increasing stress as attackers target the name resolution service for a particular victim they are after. Frequently the authoritative name resolution for the victims is running on a shared DNS service provider infrastructure. When this infrastructure is attacked all of the other customers using that infrastructure are victimized. In some cases the DNS service provider may take on customers who actually attract packet flooding DDoS attacks. If the DNS service provider knows this or becomes aware of it, they can isolate that customer from other parts of the infrastructure or possibly even refuse to do business with them. When packet flooding DDoS attacks target the DNS it is not always easy to know who the intended target is. Attackers often do not send DNS queries or packets that indicate the ultimate target they are trying to disrupt service for. As we will see below, the intended victim is often very dificult to determine.
A. Attack of the Open Resolvers
Beginning in early 2006 a wave of powerful flooding attacks hit some large DNS service providers. The technique used was a combination of open resolvers, source address spoofing and amplification (described above). A number of DNS service providers around the world saw large DNS answers arriving at their systems. This resulted from open resolvers sending replies for a name that mapped to a large sized answer back to the spoofed source address of one or more DNS service providers.
We witnessed attacks similar to those described by Verisign in their NANOG 37 presentation. [5] We saw an aggregate of many gigabits of this type of attack reaching our infrastructure. Attacks using open resolvers for reflection and amplification still occur, but not as frequently against the root and TLD infrastructures. It is unclear why this is the case, but it is worrisome that this attack vector is still as effective today as it was in early 2006.
B. HYIPs Yield Many Packets
As mentioned earlier, some DNS service customers may attract packet flooding DDoS attacks. There are a class of dubious online money-making sites such as High-Yield Investment Programs (HYIPs) and auto-surfs that fit this characterization. [24] [25] HYIPs and autosurfs are generally found to be an online form of a pyramid scheme, also known as a Ponzi Scheme named after Charles Ponzi who in the early twentieth century became infamous for his notorious money making scam.
[26] [27] For all their shortcomings these schemes remain extremely popular with the public. While no one knows for sure how much money is involved in this marketplace, a recent case involving one such sham documented over 300,000 investors spending over $50 million dollars! [28] With that kind of money at stake these shady operations may attract other sorts of nefarious players into this marketplace. Repercussions for threats, damage and attacks against these shady operators may be met with little sympathy from the world community. In fact, it is this combination of money and questionable legality that seems to make these services and their supporting infrastructure prime candidates for an attack.
In mid to late 2006 we witnessed a number of attacks that once investigated led to victims running one or more HYIP-related websites. Operators of these financial scams are often attracted to and frequently switch between many low-cost and free DNS service providers. Unfortunately for these providers new clients do not usually disclose the nature of their business and provide no warning that they may attract future DDoS attacks. Since attacks against these types of sites have become more frequent, DNS operators have become more aware of them and more careful of who they choose to do business with.
C. Roots and TLD February 2007
During the 39th North American Network Operators Group (NANOG) meeting in February, 2007, a distributed packet flooding attack struck some root server instances and at least one of the TLD name server set. [29] This attack was noticeable and did effect service for some server instances, but was largely mitigated through the widespread adoption of DNS anycast and the redundancy in server operator infrastructures.
The February 2007 attack was unique in that it hit some of the root server instances and was noticed by people in the operations community, with the help of automated root and TLD monitoring tools. [30] [31] [32] After some analysis by our team and with the assistance of others in the security community, we discovered a number of details about this attack. This attack was controlled by an HTTP-based bot-net, which was provided instructions to attack a subset of the root servers and at least one TLD server set. We did not capture the actual attack commands for the attack, but can speculate as to what they were based on the analysis of the botnet shortly thereafter. Each bot was instructed to send zero to 1023 bytes of random data to DNS server addresses on UDP port 53. With tools that could fully decode a DNS header and its payload it was relatively easy to identify the attack traffic. However, tools that filter based on traffic characteristics within the DNS message are not widely available nor widely deployed in operator networks. This situation makes mitigation more challenging than it might otherwise be.
V. Attack Motivators
In two of the real-world attacks briefly described in the previous section it is not clear why the root or TLD DNS infrastructure was targeted. Some people have suggested that these targets were selected by an attacker to measure their resistance to attack or gauge the strenth of his/ her attack method or perhaps as a demonstration of the attacker's capabilities. Other attacks such as those targeting HYIP and autosurf availability, frequently have motivations such as revenge, extortion or fiscal damage.
When we attempt to understand what happened and why, we have to review the communications protocols and software involved in the attack. This is best done at some vantage point in the botnet. Specifically we'd like to examine the command and control communications of the botnet. Ideally we'd also like to be able to intercept the communications of the attackers and any involved parties behind the attack. As a victim, these vantage points are generally difficult to obtain. If we are able to somehow gain access to this kind of intelligence, we can better understand the attack, the attacker's motivations and better mitigate future attacks. There are volunteer groups who understand this command and control infrastructure as well as the underground culture that utilitize these exploits. Team Cymru has recently published two eye-opening accounts of what goes on in the underground. [33] [34] The Honeynet Project also produces a wealth of detailed technical information and analysis on the trends and motives of the underground. [35] When we have uncovered a botnet responsible for an attack we often find that it targets other seemingly unrelated victims from around the globe. Based on the research done by Team Cymru, the Honeynet Project and others, this seems to suggest that each botnet is for hire and that for each attack there may be an entirely different buyer with an entirely different objective than the prior one.
VI. Mitigation Strategies
As we've shown in this paper, packet flooding DDoS attacks can take many forms and their instigators can have many motives. The pressing issue many on the receiving end of these attacks want to know is what can be done to limit the effect of an attack. The good news is that there are some solutions available today. The bad news is that most of the solutions do not come easy or cheap. In fact, most of the solutions are insufficient by themselves as, it takes a combination of steps to proactively create an infrastructure that can withstand attacks. Even with great protection, it is still possible for a well executed attack to be too difficult to stop without new ideas and new solutions that are yet to be developed.
A. Capacity
It is standard operating producedure in operational planning to design for additional capacity well beyond what you require today. In part this is because growth trends in capacity demands require extra capacity. In practice, and relevant here, excess capacity is needed to withstand some amount of unexpected load. Network links and hardware systems come in varying sizes and configuration. Often one outstrips the other, exposing a weakpoint in the scalability of an architecture. Today the large Internet provider backbone networks have an enormous amount of capacity. However, it is no match for the potential sending capacity of the millions of hosts attached to the Internet. If enough systems collude the stress points in the Internet, including large ISP backbones will likely degrade or even fail.
Lesser systems and smaller links fair less well against a collusion of attacking hosts. Nevertheless, excess capacity, at any scale, can certainly help weather small incursions and when coupled with some of the strategies outlined below, is an important consideration in an overall plan to mitigate such attacks.
B. Anycast DNS
Normally a public IP address is assigned to a single host interface and the routing announcement that encompasses that address will be advertised by one or more directly attached upstream routers. However, this is often only the case, because it logically and technically makes sense to address and announce services this way. One could address and announce from within the same address range at unconnected locations and topologically diverse origins in an IP network. The routing topology for this scenario would appear as if a site is multihomed, possibly from multiple diverse geographic locations. However, in practice this is simply a way of achieving service diversity and load balancing since packets are routed to their topologically closest destination instance. [36] Anycast DNS has been widely deployed by a number of root and TLD DNS operators. It has been proven to help contain packet flooding DDoS attacks and studies have shown it's effectiveness on overall availability and performance statistics. [37] 
C. Local Node Distribution
Using anycast, a DNS service provider can distribute their systems selectively. The general idea of anycast is to distribute the addresses throughout the network. Packets are routed toward destinations with the nearest instance. This provides a distribution that favors well behaved or sparsely populated areas of the Internet. Large networks co-located in popular regions will still compete for service. Unfortunately, if a server instance in a dense region of the Internet is subject to a fair number of bot attackers, all in the region suffer.
Local node distribution takes anycast one step further and limits accessibility to the DNS instance to just the peer network. It does so by either restricting the address announcement from being forwarded on to other networks or by placing the DNS server instances within the peer network itself making them unreachable from outside networks. While the peer network may still overwhelm this DNS server set, it will only harm itself in doing so. This methodology not only insulates well behaved networks from misbehaving ones it also encourages users on the peer network to behave, otherwise they hurt themselves by causing problems accessing the peer DNS services. [38] [39]
D. Victim Separation
A DNS Service provider gains economies of scale by placing customers zones together into a single name-server set, but in some cases this can be problematic. For example, if a particular customer is prone to packet flooding DDoS attacks, it may be best to place that customer into a service set that is not entirely shared with other service sets. This helps limit the damage an attack can do to other customers as well as helps operators be able to tailor mitigation responses directly in the affected infrastructure, whether it be by filtering or router advertisement changes.
E. Filtering and Blackholes
Fine grained line-rate packet filtering capabilities are key components to any network infrastructure that must protect end services. Some vendor equipment is more suitable for this purpose than others. However, very few products exist that can adequately perform complex pattern-based filters as they traverse through high-speed links on backbone networks. Filtering mechanisms are often based on limited functions such as application protocols, IP addresses or packet sizes. While these capabilities are sufficient in many cases, they are largely ineffective in well-designed attacks. Blackholing source or destination addresses is also very effective, but it may be impractical, especially if it removes the availability of a service for those who need it. It is also hard to justify blackholing large lists of addresses, so for highly distributed attacks it may be impractical to use this technique.
F. Scrubbers and TCP Forcing Gear
Some network providers offer a "packet scrubbing" solution, which front-ends a service that examines the traffic and potentially intercepts it to help reduce the load on an end service. These systems can make fine-grained and complex decisions on which packets to forward or not. Their primary goal is to help shield the end customer from unnecessary load. With DNS, these systems can force queries to switch-over from UDP to TCP. By forcing DNS traffic to use TCP, these scrubbers help eliminate simple packet flooding bots from reaching their final destination. This is because they generally will not keep state information on flood packets and resend them as TCP.
G. Upstream and Community Cooperation
A process that largely lacks automation, but often has to be done is to contact upstream network operators who are carrying packet flooding DDoS traffic to a victim. Often they may not even notice that their network is carrying the traffic, but if they know about the attack they can help track, identity and mitigate it. Unfortunately this does not scale very well for small or frequent attacks. It relies on the willingness among community peers to trust and work with one another for little immediate benefit for the upstream operator, and possibly at significant cost in time and effort. DNS service providers can also cooperate between themselves, informing one another of ongoing threats or attacks. One such approach that has proven helpful is for some DNS admistrators to share which domain names turn out to be targets of DDoS attacks. Other DNS providers can then use this knowledge to either refuse to do business with those potential clients or ensure they are on an isolated infrastructure that is designed to cope with the expected frequency and size of DDoS attacks they may attract.
H. Botnet Infiltration and Mitigation
If you are aware of the command and control infrastructure directing a packet flooding DDoS attack, you may be able to completely disrupt a botnet and prevent it from carrying out further malicious activities. This requires inside knowledge of the botnet, which is not always easy to get. There are literally thousands of botnets and finding the one responsible for a particular attack may be difficult. If you can commandeer a bot or infiltrate the botnet by masquerading as a new bot you may be able to identify pieces of the command and control infrastructure that once disabled will render the botnet benign. Not only is this a time consuming and technically intensive undertaking it is not without some risk of being discovered.
I. Calling the Cops
The risk of criminal prosecution may be the best de terrent to future attacks, but obtaining legal cooperation and facilitating prosecution can be a frustrating experience. Law enforcement operations generally require extensive trails of physical and supplemental evidence to build up a case. In many jurisdictions prosecution requires a victim who is interested in even bringing a case against an attacker. Very few organizations or institutions go this far. Even if they do, this process can take months. As attacks happen on a daily basis these efforts and the delays encountered are not encouraging for the victims or for law enforcement.
VII Conclusions
Packet flooding DDoS attacks against the domain name system come in various forms and are instantiated for various reasons. Coping with flooding attacks is done by variety of measures, but one of the most successful is the widescale deployment of duplicated DNS service instances through the use of anycast and local node deployments. High-capacity links are still useful and provide buffer for some surges in traffic, but due to the overwhelming capacity of bots on the Internet, high-speed links alone are insufficient. Understanding the motivations and finding ways to increase the risks for attackers is an ongoing area of research. Only until we make the cost of launching attacks approach the costs of defending against them can we can say we've been successful. We're not there yet.
